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This research intends to examine the relation between Political Uncertainty and 
Earnings Management. This research explored the context of 15 European Union listed 
firms, on the period between 2011 and 2018, with a sample of 3.085 firms. The Earnings 
Management is measured by the discretionary accruals that were estimated by using the 
Jones model (1991) that was modified by Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005). 
The Political Uncertainty has three main measures, the existence of a legislative election 
in a specific year, the gap between first and second most voted parties of such election 
and whether or not such election caused a change of the ruling party political wing. 
The results display evidence of a connection between a Political Uncertainty 
environment and the use of Earnings Management practices as firms tend to use more 
Accruals to tackle these scenarios. 
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises demonstrate a larger usage of the 
aforementioned practices when in comparison to larger firms. 
KEYWORDS: Earnings Management; Political Uncertainty; Earnings Quality; Small 






  RESUMO 
Esta tese tem como propósito explorar a relação entre a Incerteza Política e a Gestão 
de Resultados. Esta dissertação baseou-se no contexto das empresas cotadas numa 
contexto de Europa a 15, no período compreendido entre 2011 e 2018, com uma amostra 
de 3.085 empresas. A Gestão de Resultados é medida através dos Accruals discricionários 
tendo estes sido estimados através do modelo de Jones (1991) que foi, posteriormente, 
modificado por Dechow et al. (1995) e por Kothari et al. (2005). 
A Incerteza Política utiliza três medidas principais sendo estas a existência de eleições 
num dado ano, a diferença percentual entre o primeiro e segundo partidos mais votados 
bem como se esta eleição se traduziu numa alteração do espectro político do partido no 
governo. 
Os resultados obtidos evidenciam uma ligação entre um clima de Incerteza Política e 
o uso de práticas de Gestão de Resultados visto que, tendencialmente, as empresas 
utilizam mais Accruals quando estes cenários se verificam. 
As Pequenas e Médias Empresas demonstram uma maior utilização das práticas 
supramencionadas em comparação com o que se verifica em empresas maiores. 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Gestão de Resultados; Incerteza Política; Qualidade dos 
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The financial crisis of 2007-2008 internationalized the term PIGS referring to 
Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain as the European countries that were struggling the 
most with such crisis (Fernandes & Mota, 2011) or the term Troika, the name that was 
attributed to the International Monetary Fund negotiators (Legido-Quigley et. al 2016). 
This names almost worked as a financial and economic instability barometer which led 
countries to have to tackle with an unstable political and social environment (Harper, 
2014). 
There is a relation between political instability and poor macroeconomic 
performances (Allen, Gu & Kowalewski, 2012; Bussiere, 2010). And a link between the 
political and economic instability with the utilization of Earnings Management (EM) 
(Filip & Raffournier, 2014) thus concluding that both Political Uncertainty (PU) and the 
lack of financial welfare may influence a firm’s approach to EM practices. 
Healy & Whalen (1999) believe that a firm intends to use EM with the purpose of 
misleading shareholders and the market in general or either to prevent regulatory 
intervention. Twenty years after this breakthrough, one may find that this topic is strongly 
linked to smaller and medium-sized enterprises (SME) as there is a lack of scrutiny when 
in comparison to larger firms, due to their size. To mention, also, that it is possible to see 
the display of the scrutiny influence on audited SME as those in this situation tend to use 
less accruals (Huguet & Gandia, 2014). 
Although the scrutiny in SME smaller the accruals usage should not be seen as a 
phenomenon that only occurs in SME firms as it is transversal to larger firms (Filip & 
Raffournier, 2014) although such decrease is more associated, as mentioned above, to a 
crisis environment. 
This thesis uses financial and legislative elections data beginning in 2010 and 
finishing in 2018. Considering the years of 2007 and 2008, as the zenith of the recent 
financial crisis, is possible to say that the years in analysis display a period of economic 




This thesis is based on a sample that comprises 3085 firms from all the EU-15 
countries, with those observations corresponding to the period between 2010 and 2018 
for both the financial and political aspects of this research. 
This work has the intent of understanding the behaviour of the state and privately-
owned firms regarding a period of legislative elections and the immediate aftermath 
environment inherent to this set of scenarios. 
There is a lack of studies, European based, that explore the theme of this work. One 
is going to find numerous papers analysing the relation between PU, even if other 
measures are computed in order to study this event, and EM. Such papers mostly sample 
the United States and the vicissitude of their political system. This thesis aims to provide 
some in-depth analysis of this theme in a European context. 
On a more specific notice this thesis studies how the discretionary accruals are 
associated to three main factors of a legislative election period; the existence, or non-
existence, of an election on a given year, the voting margin between the first and second 
most voted parties and whether or not there was a change in the political spectrum of the 
winning party. Besides those three main PU measures, two other were created; one that 
only considers elections where the voting gap was below 5% and the other combines this 
measure with the one for the change of the political wing. 
The discretionary accruals were studied in accordance to the Jones (1991) model that 
was modified by Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005). 
To sum up the hypothesis in study are: 
• The level of EM is positively associated to higher election numbers. 
• The level of EM is associated to larger gaps between the most voted party and 
the second most voted party. 
• Countries where the ruling party changes are more likely to have higher EM 
levels. 
• A short gap in the elective results leads to high levels of EM. 





This thesis follows, in chapter 2, with the literature review that connected the two 
major topics of this research. It begins with the concept of EM, which, subsequently has 
a two-folded discrimination; one for Earnings Quality and another for Real Earnings 
Management. Afterwards the concept of PU is introduced and explained. Following the 
sub-chapter for PU, there are some relevant notions and definitions regarding 
Macroeconomic and Fiscal Policies and also about Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises. 
Finishing this chapter, the empirical evidence and the explanation of the hypotheses to 
test are presented. 
On chapter 3, the data source for both the financial inputs and the political evidence 
is presented. Chapter 4 relates to chapter 3 as it explains the process made in order to 
transform the available inputs in the final database as well as the model to be applied. 
In chapter 5 the main results are shown, whether there is, or not, EM practices during 
a PU environment, and the discussion of such results. It also displays some additional 
analysis on the topic of the thesis, specifically the EM behaviour in case of existence. 
Finishing this thesis there is the 6th chapter which provides the conclusions, discusses 
the limitations and also suggests paths for future research.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In EU-15 every four or five years, depending on the legislative organization of a 
specific country, there are elections to choose the composition of the parliament which 
may create an uncertainty environment. 
This sort of uncertainty environment may allow the management to manipulate the 
financial reports with the purpose of misleading all parts, allowing to gather potentially 
better results thus creating a better financial welfare for the firm (Godfrey et al., 2003; 
Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Healy & Whalen (1999. P. 16) further state that “the findings 
indicate that earnings management occurs for a variety of reasons, including to influence 
the stock market perceptions, to increase management’s compensation, to reduce the 
likelihood of violating lending agreements, and to avoid regulatory intervention”. 
There are multiple paths in which adverse political environments affect a firm’s 




may work as risk manager therefore allowing for a more cautious, yet positive, outcome 
leading firms that have different ideologies in their board of directors to perform better 
(Kim, 2012). 
Corroborating the principle of real earnings management and enforcing the effect of 
political affiliation, Ding (2013) also shows that there is a positive effect of political 
affiliation on the firms’ performance complementing the work done by Kim (2012). 
Both this connections between the political ideologies and a firm’s performance 
shown by Kim (2012) and Ding (2013) may be complemented with the fiscal approach 
taken by the right-wing or the left-wing. The first one relies on spending cuts while the 
other raises taxes although both these approaches have the intent of lowering the deficit 
(Tavares, 2004). 
Tavares (2004) allows the present thesis to generalize a stricter fiscal policy regarding 
the parties composing the left-wing, in the countries in study, and a lighter tax charge for 
the parties posing on the right-wing. Given the accrual-based model, taxation is a material 
aspect in this thesis. 
2.1. Earnings Management 
EM may be defined has a decision-making process between different accounting 
standards with the intend of reaching a specific goal (Davidson et al., 1987). Such goal is 
qualified by Schipper (1989) as a personal motivation, a performance reward for instance, 
and broadens it to investing and financing decisions. 
McNichols (2000) seems to disagree with Schipper (1989) as the author considers the 
markets to be efficient and, therefore, the management incentives to be less important 
than the capital market incentives. 
There are two major paths for the results manipulation: through accruals, which may 
be used with the intent of either rising or diminishing the reported income (Bergstresser, 
2006) or through real activities manipulation (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
The accruals manipulation is performed in accordance to accounting choices thus not 
affecting the firm’s cash flows. The real activities manipulation is related to operational 




also affect the accruals.” Much of the current research on earnings management focuses 
on detecting abnormal accruals.” (Roychowdhury, 2006. p. 2). 
Roychowdhury (2006) managed also to conclude, through the use of numerous Real 
Earnings Management measures, on the intent of obtaining a specific reporting criterion 
with the purpose of smoothing the book’s annual losses. 
Managers tend to prioritize real earnings management instead of the accrual-based 
earnings management by considering that the first may be seen as a strategic decision 
and, therefore, harder to prove, even if such path may lead to financially relevant costs 
for the firm (Cohen & Zarowin, 2008). 
The accrual-based practice also grants importance to the Earnings Quality concept as 
it can be seen has a twofold concept that uses the results persistence and the accruals as 
its components (Dechow, 2010).  
The aforementioned concepts are measured in two distinct ways, one based on the 
market and another based on accounting. The accounting-based method comes as more 
relevant to understand the current research as it considers the accruals quality, its 
predictability, persistence and smoothness. These indicators are measured with the use of 
cash, accruals and earnings (Francis, 2003). 
2.2 Political Uncertainty 
Pastor & Veronesi (2012) define Political Uncertainty as the uncertainty inherent to 
the future actions of the government sustained by the belief that companies delay their 
investments within an elective period. This delay may generate skepticism regarding 
policy changes (Jens, 2017). “We interpret policy changes broadly as government's 
actions that change the economic environment” (Pastor & Veronesi, 2012. p. 1). 
The existence of this environment, or PU, creates an investment contraction that 
influences the market by making it act thus diminishing its quality (Bird, 2017) which 
leads to an increase in volatility affecting a firm’s performance (Jens, 2016). 
The uncertainty of an elective period impacts the private sector and, consequently, a 
firm’s performance and its management as there may be a change in the ruling party and, 




Bernanke (1983) in his investment model, provides an understanding of the 
conclusions made by Jens (2017) by showing that the ability to change the state policy, 
which either directly or indirectly can affect a project’s payoff, leads to a more cautious 
approach by the firms. 
Complementing Bernanke (1983), the elective years affect the market and the share 
price as there tends to be less information hence creating white noise that can be harder 
to antecipate (Durnev, 2010).  
2.3 Macroeconomic and Fiscal Policies 
Mankin (2009) introduces the aspect of the short-term and long-term effect of the 
macroeconomic policies which is complemented by Blanchard (2010) by enlightening 
such policies as being a set of economic measures with the intent of positively affecting 
the economy and its growth. 
Pantzalis (2000) states that one may expect positive pricing shifts on the aftermath of 
a political uncertainty environment created by an elective period. The winning party’s 
policy implementation is related to the environment mentioned above. Such statement 
assigns importance to both the concepts of macroeconomic policy and fiscal policy 
qualifying them as crucial given that they provide a relevant base for the accrual-based 
concept of EM. 
Hibbs (1977) suggests that international comparisons between left-wing and right-
wing leads one to acknowledge that the left spectrum adopts a more socialist ideology by 
accepting higher inflation rates but trading these rates with lower unemployment rates 
and a broader budget policy whereas the right wing has lower inflation rates, which can 
provide an association to a more liberal ideology and a lighter fiscal policy although it 
reflects itself on higher unemployment rates. 
A lighter taxation may be seen has an expansionist measure (Alesina, 2010) which 
may be reflect itself on the EM analysis when a country as a political wing change. 
For the purpose of this thesis, one may define fiscal policy as a set of public measures, 





2.4 Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
This thesis explores the existence of EM on small and medium sized enterprises 
(SME) given so that concept is going to be explained below. 
The European Commission (2005) considers as small and medium-size enterprises 
the firms that either have a number of workers below 250 people, or a turnover equal or 
smaller than €50m or a balance sheet total smaller than €43m. This last aspect was the 
one considered in this work. 
Taylor & Taylor (2014) believe that SME tend to perform worst if the managerial 
decision is to follow the same practices as large firms and that different sizes require 
different strategies. 
The idea of testing the EM for the SME follows the footsteps let by Taylor & Taylor 
(2014) as, given the input of “different sizes require different strategies”, it is required to 
understand whether SME and large firms have different approaches to EM. 
2.5 Earnings Management and Political Uncertainty 
Bittlingmayer (1998) has a theory on investment that states that investing during a 
period of PU leads to an output decrease and an increase in volatility, given that it 
increases the firms cost of capital (Pastor, 2013) and reduces both, in quantity and quality, 
the available information that the market participants have (Baloria, 2014). 
Bird (2017) and Jens (2017) believe that this volatility increase and its effect on the 
market may lead a firm to underperform, and such underperformance, on the long term, 
may lead to the lack of financial welfare which has the effect of leading firms to relay 
more on the use of accruals (Linck et al. 2013). 
Roychowdhury (2010) found that firms that are politically connected have more 
discretionary accruals has a protection for a possible loss of the party to which they are 
affiliated. 
Kelly, Pastor and Veronesi (2016) found that the market suffers due to a weaker 




Filip & Raffournier (2014) found that, during the 2007-2008 financial and political 
crisis, EM practices had a significant decrease. The way European countries responded 
to the financial crisis and how they were damaged in this period was significantly 
different. South European countries and Ireland, the countries composing the PIGS 
acronym, were severely affected by the crisis (Fernandes & Mota, 2011) and that led to a 
highly unstable political environment given that macroeconomic policies affect the 
private sector performance and its growth (Basu & Stiglitz, 2016) while also affecting the 
labor market thus leading to a macroeconomic underperformance (Rose, 1991). 
Studies performed by Allen, Gu & Kowalewski (2012) and Bussiere (2000) 
concluded that there is a relation between a PU environment and economic vulnerability 
which relates to the findings of Basu & Stiglitz (2016). 
If firms are in need of tackling low demand periods, in which they are unsure of their 
source and how much it will last, they tend to delay investments with the purpose of 
understanding such condition. This variation in demand may be turned into a more 
enduring downward fluctuation affecting the economy (Bernanke, 1983) and enhancing 
the belief of the disturbance associated with PU. 
 
2.6 Hypotheses 
All of the following hypothesis are being studied for two different scenarios; one that 
only considers SME and other that considers both SME and large firms. 
H1: The level of EM is positively associated to higher election numbers. 
Julio & Yook (2012) state that an elective period impacts the private sector, the firms’ 
performance and its management due to the uncertainty of a possible change in the ruling 
party and, therefore, a change in the policies to be applied.  
This assumption is based on the premise that a higher number of elections suggests a 
higher level of political instability, given that the social and political environment do not 
provide a solid base for the elected party to live through the mandate, and, therefore it 
also suggests that the PU is more significant in these countries. Focusing on the countries 




Jones Model (Jones, 1991), modified by Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005) 
is going to be applied in order to test this assumption. 
 
H2: The level of EM is associated to larger gaps between the most voted party 
and the second most voted party. 
The gap between first and second most voted parties can be seen as an important 
aspect of the considerations made by Julio and Yook (2012). This hypothesis tests if 
broader gaps elections between the two most voted parties are necessarily tested to 
understand how PU affects those countries listed companied EM. 
Kelly, Pastor and Veronesi (2016) state the policy changes which are more likely to 
occur in elective periods affect the markets, thus affecting the listed companies. It is 
intended to understand whether or not a more certain elective environment leads to more 
EM practices given that it is unlikely that such certainty entails policy changes, and firms 
are used to the approach taken by such government.  
 
H3: Countries where the ruling party changes are more likely to have higher EM 
levels. 
Policy changes which are likely to occur in elective periods affect the markets, which, 
consequently affects the listed companies (Kelly, Pastor and Veronesi, 2016).  
This hypothesis has the goal of understanding if the unknown regarding an eventual 
fiscal and economic policy change leads firms to protect themselves through accruals. 
H4: A short gap in the elective results leads to high levels of EM. 
Under hypothesis 4, it is intended to overcome a hypothetical mismatch between the 
EM practices and larger voting gaps. Given so, this hypothesis tests if a more uncertain 
election leads to the use of accruals as a form of protection. 
 





By combining both the third and fourth hypothesis, this hypothesis intends to 
understand the firms’ behaviour on a highly uncertain elective environment. 
3.  DATA SOURCE 
The data used in this dissertation had two main sources. The financial inputs were 
obtained through the Amadeus database while the political evidence came from the EU 
website, Parties and Elections. 
3.1 Financial Inputs 
The Amadeus database provides financial information about public and private 
European firms, taking advantage of this database financial data for 4378 firms was 
gathered. 
Such financial data belongs to the countries that compose the “Europe of the 15” (EU-
15), a concept that dates back to the period between 1995 and 2004 where the European 
Union was composed by 15 countries; Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and United Kingdom 
(Alvarez- Plata, 2003). 
The information collected from the aforementioned database comprehends the period 
between 2010 and 2019 and has, as financial data, the values, in thousands, for Intangible 
Assets, Current Assets, Debtors, Cash & Cash Equivalents, Total Assets, Fixed Assets, 
Owner’s Equity, Long Term Debt, Current Liabilities, Loans, Creditors, Operating 
Revenue, Net Income and Depreciations & Amortizations. 
Furthermore, as general information, it was obtained the company name, its country 
and city, the NACE code Rev.2 main section, the BvD Independence Indicator and the 
firm’s auditor company. 
3.2 Political Evidence 
Using the Parties and Elections website, the data for all the legislative elections in the 




This information was then bundled into a database which considered the following 
inputs: 
• Election year: a binary input that takes the value 1 if that year had elections in that 
specific country and 0 otherwise. 
• Voting Margin %: the percentage value of the gap between the first and second 
most voted parties. 
• Political Wing Change: a binary input that assumes the value of 1 if there is a 
change of the ruling party to a different political spectrum and 0 otherwise. 
• Margin < 5: 5% was defined has the highest value of the “close call” range. It is 
also a binary input that assumes 1 if the gap between first and second most voted 
parties is below 5% and 0 otherwise. 
• Margin & Change: a binary input that combines the “Political Wing Change” and 
the “Margin < 5” therefore assuming 1 if the both conditions are verified and 0 if 
not. 
4. METHODOLOGY 
In order to be able to perform the tests and subsequent analyses, the database extracted 
from Amadeus was cleaned in order to only consider the companies with all of the data 
for years in study. This task allowed for the computation of the measures shown below 
for EM according to the Jones model (Jones, 1991), modified by Dechow et al. (1995) 
and Kothari et al. (2005) with those measures being the variation for: 
• Current Assets 
• Liabilities 
• Cash & Cash equivalents 
• Short-term debt 
• Depreciations and amortizations 
Using the following formula, the value for Total Accruals was calculated: 
Equation 1: 
!"#$%	'(()*$%+ = 	








∆CA = The variation of the Current Assets for the year n; 
∆CL = The variation of the Current Liabilities for the year n; 
∆Cash = The variation of the Cash & Cash Equivalents for the year n; 
∆SD = The variation of the Short-Term Debt for the year n; 
∆Dep. = The variation of depreciations and amortizations for the year n. 
 
Afterwards, the values for Total Assets and Tangible Assets and the variation of sales 
were included in the file with the purpose of allowing for the computation of other 
variables, so that it was possible to calculate the Modified Jones Model (Jones, 1991), 
modified by Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005) that is displayed below. This 
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Where: 
Total Accrualsij = Total accruals of the year j, for firm i. 
Total Assetsij = Total Assets of the year j, for firm i. 
Total Assetsij-1 = Total Assets of the year j-1, for firm i. 
∆Revij = Variation of sales of the year j, for firm i. 
Tangible Assetsij = Tangible Assets for the year j, for firm i. 





Thus, this linear regression model allowed to calculate: 
• 1/Total Assets 
• ∆Revij/Total Assets 
• Tangible Assets/Total Assets 
These computations allowed for a preliminary database “clean-up”, where the contra 
nature values where removed (e.g. negative values on Sales) and also the outliers (e.g. 
debt values higher than 100%). 
After the clean-up, the database had 3762 firms which still had all years, sectors and 
countries available from the initial sample.1 
Some control variables where also added: 
• Loss: a binary variable where 1 stands for a negative Net Income and 0 a positive 
one. 
• Big4: a binary variable where 1 stands for the firm being audited by a Big 4 and 
0 otherwise. 
• Gsales: the percentage value of sales growth. 
• End: the percentage value of indebtedness measured by Total Debt/Total Equity. 
• Size: the logarithm of the Total Assets in order to perceive the firms dimension. 
• ROA: the return on assets. 
Afterwards the Amadeus database and the PU database were joined so that the 
analyses could be performed using a comprehensive database. 
Subsequently to running the model on Stata a final clean-up of the database was made, 
with the purpose of deleting the outliers present in the residues of the model, leaving this 
database with data from all years and sectors and a final number of 3.085 firms. 
                                               






In order to proceed to the statistical analysis of the available data in the final database, 
the Stata software was used to develop the basic analyses such as the descriptive statistics 
which is shown below. 
The same software was then used to create 3 sets of dummy variables related to the 
Year (dYear), Sector (dSector), and the Country (dCountry). 
The Modified Jones Model (Jones, 1991), modified by Dechow et al. (1995) and 
Kothari et al. (2005), mentioned above, and shown below was the next step taking in the 
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After the regression mentioned above, Stata was used to predict the residuals of this 
model, creating the variable EM Signal, and then the absolute value of the residuals, 
through the use of the Stata command that allows to do so, led to the creation of the 
variable EQ (Earnings Management). 
Finishing the clean-up of the database the outliers present in the variable Gsales and 
EQ were deleted in order to reduce the white noise. The firms that had a value of total 
assets that was considered to low, below EUR 1,8 million, were also erased from the 
database. 
Thus, the empirical approach followed the model below: 
Equation 4: 
KL = MNA + 1"++ + OBF4 + KEP + Q+$%6+ + 4BR6 
Where: 
EQ = Earnings Quality. 




Loss = Whether or not the firm had a negative net income, a binary variable 
assuming 1 if it occurs 0 otherwise. 
Big4 = Whether or not the firm is audited by a Big 4 company, a binary 
variable assuming 1 if it occurs 0 otherwise. 
End = The value for the financial leverage of the firm measured by Total 
Debt/Total Equity. 
Gsales = The percentage for the sales variation for the firm. 
Size = Logarithm of the Total Assets to represent a firm’s size. 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
On average the number of election years in the period between 2011 and 2018 is, 
roughly a quarter of the sample (25,3%) as it can be seen on Table 4 on appendix B. 
Focusing on the voting margin the Table provides an average of 11%, stating that, 
usually, the elections were not close call. This input also has, as its minimum value 1% 
and as maximum value of 32%. These values were computed only considering the years 
where an election occurred so that there is no white noise from the 0 of the non-election 
years. 
The sample also comprises, on average, 7,5% of elections where there was a change 
of the ruling party and that change came with a different political spectrum. 
As PU variables there is also, on average, 9,8% of election years that had a voting 
margin smaller than 5% and 4,1% where that smaller gap also brought a different political 
wing to the government. 
One may see the sample description by country, year and sector in tables 1, 2 and 3, 
respectively, in appendix A. 





Considering the sectors, the ones most represented are sector M: Professional, 
scientific and technical activities, C: Manufacturing and J: Information and 
communication. 
The average of the discretionary accruals observed in the sample has a positive sign 
(0,559), which means that, on average, the firms comprising the sample intend to use EM 
practices with the purpose of increasing the reported results. 
Table 4 also displays that approximately 30% (29,9%) of the firms in the sample have 
reported a negative net income, although, on average, the value for the financial leverage 
of the firms is 0,123, which is low considering the high value of losses in the sample. 
Complementing the conclusion regarding the net income loss, one may also observe 
that the Return on Assets has a negative average (-0,007). 
5.2 Correlations 
Focusing on the control variables (see table 16 in appendix C), one may see that the 
correlation between the variables Big4 and EQ is negative. This can be supported by the 
idea that the Big 4 companies practice more scrutiny to the firms that they audit leaving 
them to have less freedom to practice EM. 
To complete this idea, the correlation between Size and EQ presents a negative value 
showing that larger firms are less likely to recur to the use of EM.  
There is a positive correlation between Loss and the EQ thus displaying that when 
firms have a worst financial welfare they tend to relay on EM practices. The correlation 
between the financial leverage variable (End) and the EQ has a negative sign which shows 
that a great level of debt by itself does not lead a firm to use EM. 
The PU variables are weakly correlated to the EQ. The variable of the ElectionYear 
has a negative sign showing that there is a weak correlation between it and the usage of 
EM although saying that, due to its sign, these practices tend to be more recurrent in such 
scenario, the variable of the VotingMargin behaves in same manner as the one for the 
ElectionYear as does the variable for PoliticalWingChange.  Margin5 and MarginChange 




It is also important to mention that the correlations between the variable Big4 and all 
of the variables related to PU are negative hence saying that the Big 4 audited companies 
tend to gain with this uncertainty environment. 
An aspect shown in this correlation matrix that qualifies itself as interesting to this 
research is the correlation between MarginChange and the End variables, given that it has 
a positive sign which tells that, a change on the political spectrum of the ruling party on 
a close call election, firms tend to be more leveraged. 
5.3 Linear Regression Analysis 
The following tables present the results for the different hypothesis. 
All the tests computed below were controlled for the year fixed effects and sector 
fixed effects. 
All tables are divided in three separate columns, one for the general model, one for 
the SME and the other for the large firms. 
Table 1 : The existence of elections influences the practice of EM 
 
Variables All SME Large Firms
Election Year 0,0038 0,1046* -0,0028
(0,016) (1.94) (-0.35)
Gsales 0,2268 -0,1343*** 0,0452***
(1,58) (-5.61) (6.73)
End -0,5762 -0,5016*** 0,0663***
(10,61) (-4.36) (3.35)
Loss 0,1852*** -0,123*** 0,0388***
(8,64) (-2.79) (4.83)
Big4 0,036* 0,0875* 0,0013
(1,82) (1.84) (0.19)
Size -0288*** -1,414*** -0,0336***
(-66,72) (-59.35) (-19.13)
obs 16.109 5.176 10.933
R-squared 0,2797 0,4213 0,0485
Adj R-squared 0,2791 0,4199 0,0473






Table 1 presents the results for the first hypothesis. Considering the model for the set 
of all firms, the election year does not have a generalized effect on the firms’ use of EM 
practices. 
In this scenario it is important to mention that the firm’s size and the negative net 
income variables proved themselves has highly significant (p-value < 0,01). This says 
that firms recur to EM if they suffer from these three conditions. A firm being audited by 
a Big 4 company also reveals to be significant in this hypothesis. 
Focusing only on SME, one can see that the entire model is statistical significance 
displaying the effect that a legislative period has on smaller firms. 
For larger firms, the election year dummy variable is not statistical provide 
significance, as verified on the general model, allowing to conclude that the use of EM, 
in this scenario, is a trend of smaller firms. 
The control variables are in line with the previous literature. 
 
Table 2 : Larger gaps lead to the usage of EM 
 
Variables All SME Large Firms
VotingMargin 0,4079** 1,2968** 0,0011
(2.02) (2.57) (0.02)
Gsales 0,0224 -0,1345*** 0,0452***
(1.56) (-5.62) (6.73)
End -0,5744*** -0,4937*** 0,0663***
(-10.58) (-4.29) (3.35)
Loss 0,1857*** -0,1205*** 0,0387***
(8.67) (-2.73) (4.82)
Big4 0,0385* 0,0888* 0,0013
(1.94) (1.87) (0.20)
Size -0,2879*** -1,4132*** -0,0336***
(-66.78) (-59.36) (-19.13)
obs 16.109 5.176 10.933
R-squared 0,2799 0,4216 0,0485
Adj R-squared 0,2793 0,4202 0,0473






Table 2 presents the results for the hypothesis that tests whether or not firms tend to 
use more EM if the result for the election is more certain. 
This regression displays evidence (p-value<0,05) of a relation between the gap of 
the first and second most voted parties and the practices of EM, for the general model. 
The coefficient states that the more certain the election the more use of EM. This 
may be due to the knowledge that firms have related to the scrutiny that have with the 
maintenance of the ruling party or the certainty regarding the policies that are going to be 
implemented. Given the less scrutiny that SME have and the significance (p-value<0,05) 
that this model has when only testing for this kind of firms one is able to sustain the 
previous justification. 
All the control variables with the exception of the sales growth also prove to be 
significant in this model. 
 
Table 3 : Political Change causes EM practices 
 
Variables All SME Large Firms
PoliticalWingChange 0,0693* 0,3724*** 0,0082
(1.84) (4.25) (0.64)
Gsales 0,0231* -0,1312*** 0,0452***
(1.61) (-5.48) (6.73)
End -0,5831*** -0,5354*** 0,0654***
(-10.72) (-4.65) (3.30)
Loss 0,1845*** -0,1307*** 0,0387***
(8.61) (-2.96) (4.82)
Big4 0,0423** 0,1004** 0,0022
(2.10) (2.11) (0.32)
Size -0,2881*** -1,4185*** -0,0337***
(-66.70) (-59.55) (-19.15)
obs 16.109 5.176 10.933
R-squared 0,2799 0,4229 0,0485
Adj R-squared 0,2793 0,4215 0,0474






The results for Table 3 do show a statistically significant (p-value<0,1) connection 
between the use of EM practices and a change on the ruling party that comes with a 
different political spectrum. 
The fear of the unknown and the uncertainty on how the political ideology is going 
to work, leads the firms to want to protect themselves and, as so, they tend to relay more 
on EM. 
Such occurrence appears to be a small firm trend as it proves to be highly significant 
on SME, with a (p-value<0,01) but fails to grant evidence when regressed only for larger 
firms.  
All the control variables are statistically significant in both the general and the SME 
model, with special emphasis on the results obtained in the variables for financial leverage 
and for negative net income as they display that, in this sort of event, a firm in financial 
distress does rely on EM practices (p-value<0,01). 
 
Table 4 : A gap smaller than 5% leads to the use of EM 
 
Variables All SME Large Firms
Margin5 -0,0413 0,1598* -0,0005
(-1.14) (1.83) (-0.04)
Gsales 0,0225 -0,1339*** 0,0452***
(1.57) (-5.59) (6.73)
End -0,5735*** -0,5094*** 0,0663***
(-10.55) (-4.43) (3.35)
Loss 0,1858*** -0,1242*** 0,0387***
(8.67) (-2.81) (4.82)
Big4 0,0351* 0,0892* 0,0013
(1.77) (1.88) (0.19)
Size -0,2873*** -1,415*** -0,0336***
(-66.64) (-59.33) (-19.14)
obs 16.109 5.176 10.933
R-squared 0,2798 0,4213 0,0485
Adj R-squared 0,2792 0,4198 0,0473






The results of the model showed in Table 4 failed to provide statistical significance 
for the entire sample. 
The variable used to measure PU, in this case the margin being smaller than 5%, 
proves to be significant (p-value<0,1) when testing for SME. Greater levels of 
uncertainty regarding the elections winner seem to drive this set of firms to use more EM 
practices. 
Large firms are, apparently, immune to the elections results. The non-existence of 
significance in this model displays that the elective gap being short does not influence the 
usage of EM by large firms. 
All the control variables are statistically significant in the SME model. 
Table 5 : Close call and change leads to EM 
 
Table 5 displays the results for the combination of two highly uncertain election 
environments, close call elections and a change of the wing of the ruling party. 
The overall sample model fails to present statistical significance to the 
MarginChange variable thus not affecting the EM use. 
Variables All SME Large Firms
MarginChange 0,0274 0,2514** 0,0133
(0.56) (2.21) (0.78)
Gsales 0,0228 -0,1328*** 0,0452***
(1.59) (-5.54) (6.74)
End -0,5779*** -0,5202*** 0,0655***
(-10.63) (-4.51) (3.31)
Loss 0,1851*** -0,1268*** 0,0387***
(8.64) (-2.87) (4.82)
Big4 0,0371* 0,0857* 0,0021
(1.86) (1.81) (0.30)
Size -0,2876*** -1,4149*** -0,0337***
(-66.70) (-59.37) (-19.15)
obs 16.109 5.176 10.933
R-squared 0,2797 0,4214 0,0485
Adj R-squared 0,2791 0,42 0,0474






The model for SME is significant (p-value<0,05) which states that this highly 
unstable elective environment tends to influence SME to be forth when regarding EM 
use. All the control variables are, again, statistically significant. 
For larger firms, the PU variable does not prove to be significant, thus allowing to 
conclude that the use of EM in this scenario is a “smaller firm” related event possibly 
because larger firms can tackle this uncertainty with ease. 
5.4 Additional Analysis 
In order to improve these analyses, the regression above was performed again but with 
a different dependent variable. This part of the analysis has the purpose of understanding 
the behaviour of the EM practices. Through it one intends to understand, in case of 
existence of EM, if the firms practice it to increase or decrease earnings, through the use 
of accurals, by considering the sign of the coefficient. 
 The equation of the previous model was changed for the one shown below: 
Equation 5: 
)6+BP = MNA + 1"++ + OBF4 + KEP + Q+$%6+ + 4BR6 
Where: 
resid = residue of the Modified Jones Model linear regression 
PUv = Variable of PU 
Loss = Whether or not the firm had a negative net income 
Big4 = Whether or not the firm is audited by a Big 4 company. 
End = The value for the financial leverage of the firm 
Gsales = The sales variation in % for the firm 
Size = Logarithm of the Total Assets to represent a firm’s size 
Given that the previous model had, as dependent variable, the absolute value of the 
residue variable, the control variables of the following regressions will, tend to behave in 




All the tests computed below were controlled for the year fixed effects and sector 
fixed effects. 
 
Table 6 : EM signal on election years 
 
The table above displays that an election does not grant significance, by itself, on the 
overall sample. 
Taking into regard the firms that are considered SME, the ElectionYear is statistically 
significant (p-value<0,1) and has a positive sign in the coefficient. This result in the 
coefficient can be interpreted as a stronger use of accruals and, as a consequence, where 
firms manage to increase the reported earnings.  
Given that the test for the large firms, both on the main analysis and in this one, did 
not provide statistical significance, the results for this test remain similar. 
Variables All SME Large Firms
ElectionYear 0,0059 0,1062* -0,0003
(0,24) (1,92) (-0,04)
Gsales -0,0419*** -0,2027*** -0,0146**
(-2,86) (-8,25) (-2,06)
End -0,5479*** -0,5181*** 0,1348***
(-9,9) (-4,39) (6,43)
Loss 0,1049*** -0,1502*** -0,0855***
(4,8) (-3,31) (-10,05)
Big4 0,0219 0,0734 -0,0084
(1,08) (1,51) (-1,17)
Size -0,3*** -1,4065*** -0,041***
(-68,31) (-57,55) (-22,05)
obs 16.109 5.176 10.933
R-squared 0,2789 0,4056 0,0557
Adj R-squared 0,2783 0,4041 0,0546






Table 7 : EM signal for larger gaps 
 
In accordance to what was displayed in the previous analysis for the effect of a more 
certain elective period, the model displaying the entire sample statistically significant 
regarding the voting margin. 
The coefficient provides a positive sign which confirms that the use of accruals is 
positively related to a broader margin between the first and second most voted parties 
thus making firms to use more accruals hence reporting higher earnings in such period. 
For the smaller firms the behavior is identical although the coefficient displays a 
stronger positive sign. This allows to confirm that the use of accruals is more recurrent in 
this scenario. As mentioned before this can be related to a lighter scrutiny of this sort of 
firms assuring them that the ruling party is going to maintain the behavior recorded prior 
to the elections. 
Variables All SME Large Firms
VotingMargin 0,4538** 1,4163*** 0,0158
(2,2) (2,74) (0,22)
Gsales -0,0422*** -0,203*** -0,0147**
(-2,89) (-8,27) (-2,06)
End -0,5458*** -0,5094*** 0,1348***
(-9,86) (-4,32) (6,44)
Loss 0,1054*** -0,1475*** -0,0855***
(4,83) (-3,26) (-10,05)
Big4 0,0246 0,0752 -0,0083
(1,22) (1,54) (-1,15)
Size -0,3004*** -1,4057*** -0,0411***
(-68,38) (-57,56) (-22,05)
obs 16.109 5.176 10.933
R-squared 0.2791 0,4060 0,0557
Adj R-squared 0,2785 0,4045 0,0546






Table 8 : Political Change signal to EM 
 
The general sample regression keeps the PU variable statistically significant, having 
a positive coefficient and these results consider that a firm is more likely to increase the 
earnings to be reported with the purpose of protecting itself for a change in the 
macroeconomic and fiscal policies that may come with the change of the political 
spectrum of the ruling party. 
Considering only the SME, the model’s behavior is identical to the one of the general 
sample, hence also allowing for the conclusion that firms, in this scenario, are going to 
increase their earnings. 
Variables All SME Large Firms
PoliticalWingChange 0,0751* 0,3797*** 0,011
(1,96) (4,22) (0,8)
Gsales -0,0414*** -0,1996*** -0,0146**
(-2,83) (-8,13) (-2,05)
End -0,5553*** -0,5526*** 0,1336***
(-10,01) (-4,68) (6,37)
Loss 0,1042*** -0,158*** -0,0855***
(4,77) (-3,49) (-10,06)
Big4 0,0287 0,0865* -0,0071
(1,4) (1,77) (-0,97)
Size -0,3007*** -1,4112*** -0,0411***
(-68,3) (-57,75) (-22,06)
obs 16.109 5.176 10.933
R-squared 0,2791 0,4072 0,0558
Adj R-squared 0,2785 0,4057 0,0546






Table 9 : The EM signal of close call elections 
 
The SME presented Margin5 statistical significance in the model tested for EQ 
although it does not provide significance in this test. This states that, for the firms, there 
is not a constant behavior if, whether or not, they are going to use accruals to increase or 
decrease the earnings that are being reported. 
Variables All SME Large Firms
Margin5 -0,0548 0,1196 -0,0001
(-1,48) (1,33) (-0,01)
Gsales -0,0421*** -0,2024*** -0,0146**
(-2,88) (-8,24) (-2,06)
End -0,5443*** -0,5241*** 0,1348***
(-9,83) (-4,44) (6,43)
Loss 0,1057*** -0,1511*** -0,0855***
(4,84) (-3,33) (-10,05)
Big4 0,0207 0,0733 -0,0084
(1,03) (1,5) (-1,17)
Size -0,2997*** -1,4069*** -0,041***
(-68,22) (-57,5) (-22,05)
obs 16.109 5.176 10.933
R-squared 0,2790 0,4054 0,0557
Adj R-squared 0,2784 0,4039 0,0546






Table 10: The EM sign for close call and change elections 
 
Such as the analysis immediately above, both the general sample and the large firms 
do not provide PU variable significance in this test, complementing the idea that smaller 
margins do not change the approach of the larger firms. 
The analysis on SME displays a positive sign which says that firms tend to report 
higher earnings to protect themselves when in a highly uncertain legislative environment. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this thesis sought to grasp the relation between the environment of 
Political Uncertainty, the practices of Earnings Management and the strength to which it 
influences such practices. 
The existent literature finds that PU does influence the firms’ behaviour to different 
extents. There may exist a firms’ contraction in investment, which diminishes the market 
quality if those firms are affected by unstable political environments or elective periods 
(Bird, 2017). 
Variables All SME Large Firms
MarginChange 0,0331 0,2516** 0,0204
(0,66) (2,16) (1,14)
Gsales -0,0417*** -0,2013*** -0,0145**
(-2,85) (-8,19) (-2,04)
End -0,5499*** -0,5367*** 0,1336***
(-9,92) (-4,54) (6,37)
Loss 0,1047*** -0,154*** -0,0855***
(4,8) (-3,4) (-10,06)
Big4 0,0232 0,0715 -0,0072
(1,14) (1,47) (-1)
Size -0,3001*** -1,4074*** -0,0411***
(-68,3) (-57,57) (-22,08)
obs 16.109 5.176 10.933
R-squared 0,2789 0,4057 0,0558
Adj R-squared 0,2783 0,4042 0,0547






Also, during elections periods, the private sector displays increased volatility if 
compared to non-elective years which states that there is an influence of PU to the firms 
that need to tackle such election (Jens, 2017). 
Corroborating the ideas above and enforcing the political effect, Ding (2013) shows 
that there is a positive effect of political affiliation on the firms’ performance which, in a 
change scenario, can influence a firm’s financial welfare. 
The results obtained display similar results to the previous researches that were used 
as the base for this research. 
Considering only the existence of elections, SME tackle this environment by relying 
more on the use of EM. This study suggests that the management feels the need to tackle 
a hypothetical economic vulnerability that may arise with the uncertainty climate (Basu 
& Stiglitz, 2016) thus shielding themselves with EM practices by reporting higher 
revenues for the year of such election through a stronger accruals use. 
If one focuses on the voting gap between the first and second most voted parties or in 
the change of the ruling party wing, it is possible to conclude that the larger the margin 
the more firms tend to use accruals and EM practices. 
Similarly to what happens for an year of elections, if the difference between the two 
most voted parties is smaller than 5% or, besides that margin there is a wing change, 
smaller firms favour the usage of the practices in analysis. 
If one considers all the PU variables at once, the existence of an election and, once 
again, the unfamiliarity to the political choices, and scrutiny, that may come with the 
change of the political spectrum, influence the adoption of EM practices. The legislative 
period per se diminishes the practices countering the change that makes firms increase its 
usage. 
In line to what may be found in the literature this thesis also provides a linkage 
between PU and EM. 
The use of different accounting standards, in this case the use of accruals to either 
decrease or increase the income that is being reported (Bergstresser, 2006), combined 




affect the market efficiency (McNichols, 2000). As shown above, the EM practices are 
recurrent in PU environments, thus the findings of this thesis suggest that PU, in a more 
direct or indirect way, may reduce the market quality. 
Limitations and Future Research Paths  
This thesis has some limitations that need to be recognized. 
It only studies a period of eight years (2011 to 2018) given that it was only possible 
to secure data from a ten-year period but 2019 had little to none information and 2010 
has been used for computation purposes only. 
Another limitation has to do with the number of countries that are being considered. 
This research focus on the EU-15 instead of the current 28 countries that compose the 
European Union or all of the European countries. 
In line with the aforementioned limitations, it is suggested to increase the number of 
years, and also the number of countries in study, in order to fully perceive the PU 
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Appendix A: Sample 
Table 1 : Sample by Country 
 




































A Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
B Minining and quarrying 
C Manufacturing 
D Electricity, steam and air conditioning supply 
E Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 
F Construction 
G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
H Accommodation and food service activities 
I Transportation and storage 
J Information and communication 
L Real estate activities 
M Professional, scientific and technical activities 
N Administrative and support service activities 
P Education 
Q Human health and social work activities 
R Arts, entertainment and recreation 
























Appendix B: Variables 






Variable Name Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Gsales Variation of the sales from n-1 to n 16.109 0,138 0,646 -0,945 9,828
End Financial Leverage = Total Debt/Total Equity 16.109 0,123 0,171 0,000 0,994
Loss Assumes the value of 1 if the net income is negative and 0 otherwise 16.109 0,299 0,458 0,000 1,000
Big4 Assumes the value of 1 if the audit company is a big 4 and 0 otherwise 16.109 0,526 0,499 0,000 1,000
Size Logarithm of the Assets 16.109 11,992 2,423 5,584 19,861
ROA Return on Assets = Net Income/Total Assets 16.109 -0,007 0,230 -6,697 2,938
ElectionYear Assumes the value of 1 if that year has elections in a specific country and 0 otherwise 16.109 0,253 0,435 0,000 1,000
VotingMargin The gap between the first and second most voted parties 16.109 0,110 0,047 0,000 0,320
PoliticalWingChange Assumes the value of 1 if the wing of the ruling party changes and 0 otherwise 16.109 0,075 0,264 0,000 1,000
Margin5 Assumes the value of 1 if the gap between first and second is below 5% and 0 otherwise 16.109 0,098 0,298 0,000 1,000
MarginChange 16.109 0,041 0,198 0,000 1,000
sme Assumes the value of 1 if the firm's total assets are smaller than €43M and 0 otherwise 16.109 0,321 0,467 0,000 1,000
resid The residues of the Modified Jones Model giving the EM signal 16.109 0,559 1,399 -6,157 9,944
EQ The absolute value of the residues of the model 16.109 0,619 1,374 0,000 9,944
Assumes the value of 1 if the gap between first and second is below 5% and the wing of 





Appendix C: Correlation Matrix 
 
Table 5 : Correlation Matrix 
 
